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THE -LAW'S DELAYS-SOME PROCEDURAL
CHANGES
C. V. RIDGELY*
"Then, too (in law), there are a thousand causes of disgust, a
thousand delays to be endured."-Juvenal.
"Lawsuits consume time and money and rest and friends."
"The law is a sort of hocus-pocus science that smiles in your
face while it picks your pocket, and the glorious uncertainty of it
is of more use to the professors than the justice of it."-Man of
the World, Act 2, Scene 1.
It is a common belief and report that the administration of the
law in civil cases is slow, uncertain and expensive. The newspa-
pers, lecturers and individual litigant unite their voices in com-
plaint. The legislative branch of the government lends its ear,
and hasty and ill-considered legislation adds to the confusion,
and, as in the case of injuries arising out of employment, the sub-
ject matter has been removed from the realm of individual lia-
bility and judicial investigation, and settled by legislation on the
basis of policy.
It is not the purpose of this article to consider to what extent
these complaints are justified, or the underlying and fundamental
changes in our judicial system necessary to make it conform to
and meet the economic and industrial movement that now dom-
inates our political and social life. I am sure that the body
politic is not ready for the modification of our jury system, or
for the coordination of the officials having to do with the ad-
ministration of the civil law, or for the radical modification of
the laws of evidence, nor would it permit of the changes now
in common practice in England. It is but natural that this is
so. We have grown in numbers and wealth under the present
system, and it is difficult to persuade the people that any funda-
mental change is necessary.
It is to be admitted that there is reason for the complaints, and
that the cure lies, for the most part, in fundamental changes, that
will not now be permitted. But it can also be safely said that a
very material improvement can be had by means of a few
changes in methods of procedure, which changes will not conflict
with any of our basic policies or fundamental rights. It is not
* See p. 454 for biographical note.
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to be hoped that all the changes advisable can be covered in this
article, but it is hoped that the attention of the profession will be
called to the review of the subject, and that it will contribute its
knowledge and energy to the elimination of waste motion and
energy now prevalent in our methods. With this in mind, I ven-
ture to suggest these changes:
(A) In all appeals from a money judgment, the bond should
be so conditioned that the court finally trying the cause should
have the right to render judgment against the surety. On ap-
peals to the Appellate or Supreme Court, it should be so condi-
tioned that the court, on affirmance, could remand to the lower
court, with instruction to render judgment against the surety.
The same method should apply to sureties on bonds given to re-
lease mechanics' liens. Why should a litigant with a judgment be
subjected to a second suit? Often the surety has moved to an-
other county or state, and oftentimes the costs of the two suits
and th6 various appeals exhaust the money in controversy.
(B) Sec. 399, Burns 1926, should provide that, in all actions
in rem, personal service outside of the state should be equivalent
to personal service within the state, and further provide for a
method of proof of such service, to which proof would attach the
same verity that is now given a return which is made by the
sheriff. It has been held by our courts that they will deny an
application to open up such judgments where the defendant has
actual notice given as now provided, but, until such application
is made and the question determined, the title is under cloud.
With the present statute making such service equivalent to ser-
vice by publication, there is no incentive for the plaintiff to give
actual notice to the defendant. Such an amendment, and service
under it, would eliminate questions of minority, death, marriage,
etc., in addition to making merchantable title to the property in-
volved. It would be invaluable in mortgage foreclosure, mechan-
ic's lien, special assessment and quiet title cases. In these days
of rapidly changing values, a title clouded for five years is almost
worthless.
(C) In mortgage foreclosure (1) the time for redemption
should run from the institution of the action, and (2) the sale
should be had at the end of the redemption period, and should
then be absolute. It is difficult to see why an owner in default
should first have time to litigate the question of his default, and
then have an additional year to redeem. This, of course, is a
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question of legislative policy that probably does not lie in the
province of the lawyer. Why should there be a sale prior to the
year of redemption? No one but the judgment creditor will buy,
as a purchase is nothing but a loan for the year. This operates
as an injury to both the creditor and the debtor. If the sale is
at the end of the year, actual purchasers can be obtained, com-
petitive bidding will ensue, and the owner, if he cannot pay, will
obtain something near the fair value of his land, and the holder
of the mortgage has a much better chance of recovering his loan.
If, during the year, the owner can redeem, the sale and conse-
quent expense are avoided, and the holder of the judgment re-
lieved of the necessity of such advancement.
(D) The right to change of venue from the county in causes
triable only by the judge should be abolished. So long as the liti-
gant is permitted a change of the trial judge, his rights are all
protected. We all know that in mortgage foreclosures, mechan-
ic's lien cases and other causes of a similar character, change of
venue from the county is either for the purpose of delay, or a
polite way of getting away from the trial judge.
(E) Instructions. It may be thought that with all the statu-
tory law and decisions on how instructions should be prepared,
tendered, given and made a part of the record, there could be no
mistake made. Yet, the hundreds of decisions by our courts of
appeal attest to the confusion. The trial judge is confronted
with a request for a bill of exceptions by one party, and the other
insists that the instructions be made a part of the record by
order-instructions must be numbered consecutively. Why?
There seems to be no requirement to give them in numerical
order. They shall be "plainly written." This requirement is
rarely complied with by counsel and, perhaps, never by the judge,
assuming that the judge actually writes them. One of the meth-
ods used must be the best. Let us determine which is the best
and then abolish the rest of them. In other words, we have a
mass of conglomerate laws on a question of practice that should
all be repealed, and a simple law, requiring instructions to be in
writing, and the action of the judge in giving instructions and
refusing to give instructions tendered, to be made part of the
record by a bill of exceptions.
(F) Terms of court and vacation:
It seems anomalous that in this age we have fixed and prede-
termined periods for court vacations, and that practically ten or
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twelve weeks are devoted to that purpose. No other profession,
and certainly no other business, could survive such a system.
Certainly, a vacation is proper and necessary, but to suspend the
functions of the Court does not seem proper. Let provision be
made for the judge to have the privilege of absenting himself
from duty not to exceed a fixed number of days. Then the ques-
tions of writs returnable in vacation, the right of the judge to
act because of vacation period, and, principally, the total suspen-
sion of the functions of the Court, would be avoided. There is no
excuse for a Court, with jurisdiction over several hundred es-
tates and wards, having ten weeks' vacation. I am aware of the
provisions for special terms, but it is too much to expect the
judge, subject to the pressure of those litigants desiring delay, to
constantly disregard statutory requirements for vacations. There
should, where there is one circuit to the county, be but one term
each year. Provision could be made so that causes would remain
in fieri for a fixed period, say thirty days. As it now is, a cause
tried on the first day of the term is within the jurisdiction of the
judge for a period of ten weeks, while, in the case of a cause
tried on the last day, no opportunity is afforded for correction
of errors.
(G) In the administration of estates:
(1) Proof of heirship should be required to be made and
should be determined shortly after letters are issued. Within
18 months, the writer has had seven estates where heirship is in
dispute-cases where husband and wife were killed in the same
accident-cases of validity of divorce and subsequent marriage,
etc. In all these estates, administration has been difficult and
expensive because the question was not initially determined,
thereby resulting in the employment of two or three sets of attor-
neys, service of notice on different claimants, the involvement of
titles, delay in the determination of the amount of inheritance
tax, and, finally, the delay in final settlement.
(2) Where there is a will, the widow should be required to
make her election within 30 days after probate thereof. The dis-
position of property for the payment of debts, the payment of
mortgage, and many other questions of administration are af-
fected by the widow's election to take under the law, yet at pres-
ent she can wait until the end of the year before acting.
(3) Likewise, the time for contesting the will should be ma-
terially shortened, for the same reasons.
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(H) In 1927 the General Assembly provided for the commit-
ment of the insane to hospitals for the insane, by judges of the
Circuit and Superior Courts. The hearing contemplated is sum-
mary-examination by and reports from medical examiners are
used, and the hearing is held in chambers. If the party has prop-
erty, an entirely different procedure is prescribed for the deter-
mination of the question of whether or not a guardian should be
appointed. In the latter case, the prosecuting attorney must ap-
pear, the Clerk must file answer and a jury can be demanded.
Aside from the possibility that a judge may determine the party
insane and the jury find him sane, or vice versa, under the pres-
ent practice there must be two hearings to determine the one
question.
May I again urge action on the part of the bar? Let the proper
committee of the State Bar Association publicly invite proposals
looking to an improvement in procedure. When, and if, there is
a response, let the committee sift the suggestions, and those that
are deemed worthy should then be submitted to a referendum of
the entire membership. Should any be approved, let the commit-
tee, at the expense of the Association, employ draftsmen to pre-
pare the necessary bills and, when they are prepared, see that
they are introduced and passed. Can we not spend time and
money for something other than our, annual meeting?
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